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Between the Species
You Can’t Buy Your Way
Out of Veganism

ABSTRACT
Let’s make three assumptions. First, we shouldn’t support factory
farms. Second, if animal-friendly agriculture lives up to its name—
that is, if animals live good lives (largely free of pain, able to engage
in species-specific behaviors, etc.) and are slaughtered in a way that
minimizes suffering—then there is nothing intrinsically wrong with
killing them for food. Third, animal-friendly agriculture does, in
fact, live up to its name. Given these assumptions, it might seem difficult to criticize individuals who source their animal products from
“animal-friendly” agricultural operations. However, I argue that they
should drastically reduce their support for animal-friendly agriculture because it isn’t scalable—i.e., if we were to switch to that form
of agriculture, most people would be priced out of its products. I say
that it’s wrong to support a solution to a moral problem without sharing its costs.
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For better or worse, we’ve democratized meat-eating.
Meat-eating is something that was a special occasion in
most households for many years… The poor got very
little animal protein. So one of the nice things about
industrial meat production is it makes this human desire—because it is a widespread human desire—something that even the poor could satisfy, and if we eat
meat more responsibly, you know, it is going to be less
democratic. (Michael Pollan, CBC Ideas)

Introduction
Let’s make three assumptions. First, we shouldn’t support
factory farms. Second, if “animal-friendly” agriculture lives
up to its name—that is, if animals live good lives1 and are
slaughtered in a way that minimizes suffering—then there is
nothing intrinsically wrong with killing them for food. Third,
“animal-friendly” agriculture does, in fact, live up to its name.
There are, of course, good reasons to reject the second and
third assumptions—hence the quotation marks around “animal-friendly,” which I’ll now drop.2 But I’d guess that many
people make all three. If we grant these assumptions, and if
individuals source their animal products responsibly, is there
any way to criticize their behavior?
I think so. In what follows, I contend that the relatively
wealthy should eat mostly vegan even if they can afford animalfriendly animal products. The argument for this has two prem1 At a minimum, this means living a life that’s largely free of human-inflicted pain and during which animals are able to engage in species-specific
behaviors.
2 Against the second, see Regan (1987) and Adams (1990). Against the
third, see Bohanec (2013) and McWilliams (2015).
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ises. First, animal-friendly agriculture isn’t scalable, which is
to say that if we were to switch to that form of agriculture,
most people would be priced out of its products. Second, if we
endorse a norm during periods of moral change, then we ought
to bear the cost that most people would bear were the norm to
be widely accepted, even if we can afford not to. It follows that
the relatively wealthy ought to eat as most people would if the
animal-friendly model were adopted.

The Empirical Premise
Let’s begin with the empirical premise: if we were to switch
to animal-friendly agriculture, most people would be priced
out of its products. The reason to believe this claim is that it’s
extremely difficult to sell animal products at accessible prices
without the factory farm, and this is because longer, happier
animal lives are more resource-intensive than short and unpleasant ones. First, longevity and happiness take much more
water and feed for much less product. This is partially because
humanely-raised animals live up to twice as long as intensively-raised animals, but also because humanely-raised animals
convert feed to flesh less efficiently. They haven’t been bred
to gain weight in the same ways (e.g., humanely-raised chickens don’t have the massive breasts that you find in intensivelyraised chickens, since those breasts can lead to persistent joint
pain and broken limbs), and humanely-raised animals have
greater freedom of movement, which means that they burn off
more of the calories that they consume. Second, minimizing
suffering during slaughter makes the process massively less
efficient: an industrial slaughterhouse can process 2,500 cattle
in an eight-hour shift; mobile slaughter units—the standard
alternative for those who champion humane agriculture—can
process ten. Third, small farms don’t—and probably couldn’t,
for economic reasons—recover and sell all the byproducts that
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help keep meat prices low.3 They can recover and sell some
byproducts, such as offal. But others only make financial sense
when huge numbers of animals are being slaughtered, such as
collecting bovine fetal blood for medical labs, which use it to
create cell cultures.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, animal-friendly operations require much more land than their industrial alternatives. We can appreciate this point with some back-of-the-envelope calculations about chicken feed. Chicken feed is composed of grains and various supplements, all of which have to
be produced somewhere, somehow. But let’s simplify by pretending that it’s just made of wheat, which would actually be
a boon to animal-friendly operations if it were the case. In any
event, you can produce about 56 bushels of wheat on an acre.
At 60 pounds per bushel, that’s 3,360 pounds of chicken feed.
If it takes 12 pounds of feed to bring a chicken up to slaughter
weight, then one arable acre can feed 280 birds. But suppose
you want to let your chickens live off the land, eating insects
and native plants. You might want to do this for welfare reasons:
perhaps you think that animals ought to live in an environment
that’s as close as possible to their natural one, allowing them
to exhibit the full range of species-specific behaviors. Alternately, you might want to do this for environmental reasons. As
Kemmerer (2015) argues, there are excellent reasons to devote
less land to animal agriculture: e.g., the monocropping behind
animal feed leads to soil degradation, fertilizers pollute nearby
waterways, and extensive pesticide use is guilty of the same.
Moreover, as the Ecological Society of America points out, forests are superior to agricultural operations in terms of carbon

3 See Norwood and Lusk (2011) and Ogle (2013).
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sequestration,4 which is an argument for reforesting where we
can. In any case, if you want to let your chickens live off the
land, how many will you be able to raise on an acre? Estimates
vary, but I haven’t been able to find anyone who claims that
an acre can sustain more than 25 birds without feed—roughly
1/10 of what an acre supports on the industrial model.
Granted: I’ve made a number of simplifying assumptions,
the numbers I’ve used are only rough estimates, you might not
think that chickens fare best when allowed to live off the land,
and there are various ways to produce feed more sustainably
(though also less efficiently, and the land allocation problem
remains). So the point here is not that, if we switch to animalfriendly agriculture, we’ll see chicken production drop by some
specific factor. Rather, the point is this. When you couple the
observations about land use with the ones made earlier—about
feed-to-flesh conversion ratios, slaughter rates, and recoverable
byproducts—it should be clear that animal-friendly agriculture
is dramatically less efficient than industrial agriculture. Hence,
a switch to animal-friendly agriculture is going to significantly
reduce how much product is available, which is bound to drive
up its price. What’s more, there’s little hope that supply will
eventually catch up. There are plenty of ways to increase the
supply of animal products, but nearly all of them involve either
welfare compromises or unacceptable environmental costs.
We have battery cages, farrowing crates, and feedlots because
they’re efficient—not because they’re good for chickens, pigs,
and cows. Animal-friendly operations can’t use these strategies, which means that their only choice is to use more land for
either growing feed or permitting free-range grazing. And as

4 See http://www.esa.org/esa/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/carbonsequestrationinsoils.pdf
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the considerations above indicate, we’re talking about a lot of
land—far more than makes environmental sense.
At present, animal-friendly animal products cost two to
three times the price of their conventional alternatives. That,
of course, is still far from their real cost. Simon (2013) estimates that we should add another $1.70 for every dollar of retail animal food sales to account for externalized health care
and environmental costs of animal agriculture, as well as the
substantial taxpayer subsidies that keep prices artificially low.
Some of those externalized costs would be reduced if we were
to adopt animal-friendly practices—the health care costs, for
example, are partially due to overconsumption—so let’s cut his
estimate in half, adding only $0.85 per dollar. In the US, the
average price of a pound of ground beef is about $4, and the
animal-friendly stuff goes for about $8. That means that the
current real cost is nearly $15.
I’m going to assume that, all else equal, we shouldn’t allow
industries to externalize costs—it isn’t fair to the third parties
who bear them. Still, taxpayers could continue their subsidies.
Would that keep prices down?
I doubt it. First, animal-friendly farms operate on razor-thin
margins because they compete with industrial products. If they
were only competing with similar farms, they would probably
raise their prices to provide some financial stability. Second, the
factors cited above suggest that there would be a fixed ceiling
on animal-friendly production—only so much will be available. Hence, there is no reason to expect supply to keep pace
with population growth, which would drive prices yet higher.
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According to the US Department of Labor, the average
American spends 12.6% of her income on food.5 Of that,
roughly 4.2% is devoted to animal products. If the prices of
those products were to go up by a factor of 3.75—and estimate that I take to be conservative—she would have to spend
24.15% of her total budget to maintain the same level of animal product consumption, which is nearly double what she now
spends. It’s highly unlikely that the average American has this
much financial flexibility. Hence, she’s bound to have to reduce
her animal product consumption. The issue isn’t whether, but
by how much. Moreover, the average American couldn’t simply reduce her animal product consumption by a factor of 3.75,
as that would leave her missing a substantial number of calories (among other things, but let’s use the simplest metric). Getting those calories would cut deeper into the funds available
for animal products, and so we might estimate that the average
American could afford only a tenth of the animal products that
she currently enjoys. If the average American eats three meals
a day, and consumes some animal product or other at every
meal, then she’d go from eating animal products 21 times per
week to eating them twice per week. While that would still be a
far cry from strict veganism, it’s pretty close relative to current
patterns of consumption.
The upshot is that when you say that we ought not to support factory farms, you’re calling for a food system that largely
prices average consumers out of animal products. On the model you’re advancing, most people will be eating vegan at least

5 See http://www.bls.gov/cex/2014/combined/quintile.pdf.
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90% of the time—and more the poorer they are. For short, let’s
say that they’ll have to eat mostly vegan.6

The Moral Premise
But suppose you’ve got the financial means to purchase animal-friendly products, and you regularly purchase them. Given
the assumptions with which we began, it looks like your hands
are clean; you aren’t complicit in the horrors of factory farming. However, you’re avoiding complicity without sharing the
cost that most people would have to bear, which is eating mostly vegan.7 This is wrong. To be clear, the moral claim is not
that a diet rich in animal-friendly products is wrong because
it isn’t universalizable—i.e., not everyone could eat as you’re
eating. That principle is doubly implausible: first, it implies
that it’s wrong to purchase all sorts of luxury goods, vegan or
otherwise (decent whiskey, artisan-made cashew “cheese,” a
private college education); second, it implies that it’s wrong to
eat highly unusual foods, even if inexpensive, simply because
they aren’t generally available. Instead, the claim concerns our
obligations during periods of moral change.
Moral judgments often involve assessments of what it’s
reasonable to demand of others, of those sacrifices that are
6 Through this section, I’ve been assuming that there won’t be various
technological solutions to the problems created by factory farms: e.g., we
won’t begin genetically modifying animals so that they aren’t harmed by
the way we raise and slaughter them; we won’t develop environmentallysustainable industrial farms for relatively simple animals, such as oysters
or shrimp, that we begin eating en masse instead of land animals; in vitro
meat will remain prohibitively expensive; etc. If the assumption is mistaken,
then my argument becomes a brief for either eating those products or eating
mostly vegan.
7 Someone might object to the idea that this is a cost. By the lights of most
people, though, it plainly is.
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worthwhile, of how various goods should be balanced. And, of
course, our sense of what’s reasonable, what’s worthwhile, and
what matters is influenced by a host of personal and contextual
factors. Moreover, moral norms impose costs on those who adhere to them. Instead of being able to take what you’d like from
the grocery store, following the Don’t steal norm means that
you have to live on what you can afford—which might not be
much. Finally, moral norms impose different costs on people.
If I’m wealthy, then the costs of following the Don’t steal norm
are low; if you’re poor, they’re much higher.
Given all this, when the wealthy endorse moral norms that
impose costs on others, but not on themselves, they should
wonder whether they’re willing to affirm them because they
won’t bear the costs that the norms ask others to internalize. (In
the present case, the thought is something like: “Easy for me
to say—I can have steak as much as I’d like!”) By bearing the
costs directly, the wealthy remove a potential defeater for their
moral belief—namely, that they find it plausible only because
of their comfortable position. This is the epistemic justification
for the moral premise.
At the same time, by bearing the cost that most would bear,
the wealthy signal that the moral change is worth making, that
it isn’t unreasonable to ask others to internalize the relevant
costs too. In other words, internalizing the cost signals that
mere privilege isn’t what explains why the wealthy take the
cost to be an acceptable one. In part, this matters because it
gives the wealthy the standing to take morally progressive positions, which means that some of its value comes from what it
communicates to others. It indicates respect for those of whom
morality demands more. But it’s also because of the way that
signaling matters in addressing collective action problems.
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When we don’t think that others will sacrifice, it’s harder for us
to sacrifice. When the wealthy bear the costs that others would
bear, they remove an important barrier to building coalitions
that can act on issues of moral importance. This is the signaling
justification for the moral premise.
Granted, it’s often easier for the wealthy to internalize costs,
and so you might worry that the wealthy can’t send the appropriate signal without themselves becoming poor. There
is something to this thought. However, it’s a contingent fact
about us that we tend to be satisfied by parity with respect to
action-types, not requiring parity with respect to broader life
circumstances. When, for example, we recently realized that
there aren’t enough departmental funds for everyone to travel
as much as they’d like, we were satisfied by having the funds be
divided equally, even though the chair’s salary means that this
arrangement affects his travel plans much less than it affects
the rest of us. Moreover, requiring poverty would be unreasonable; requiring a similar sacrifice isn’t. This is for a Rawlsian reason: requiring poverty from the wealthy might actually
make the poor worse off. Inequality is less objectionable—and
perhaps not at all objectionable—when it benefits the least of
these. Of course, it may be that most actual inequality doesn’t
benefit the least of these. That, however, is no objection to the
point I’m making here, which is just that it isn’t reasonable to
demand equality across the board.
The wealthy might not be obliged to limit their consumption in the future; there might come a day when meat will be
an ordinary luxury good. However, they’ve got these obligations for the foreseeable future. If there is ever a change, it will
come when it’s a general cultural norm that you shouldn’t treat
animals as they’re treated in factory farms, nor should you sup-
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port those who do. At that point, we will have all judged that
the cost of these norms is reasonable, and so there won’t be
any need for the wealthy to signal that it is. So if you think
that we ought not to support factory farms, and this means that
the poor will have to eat mostly vegan, then you ought to eat
mostly vegan—at least until the norm is widely endorsed and
most accept its costs.
The situation is akin to the one we face concerning climate
change. We know that we ought to reduce our respective carbon footprints, and we know that this places a disproportionate
burden on the poor. In part, this is because the wealthy can buy
that reduction via carbon offsets—they don’t have to sacrifice
their favorite activities. Instead of swapping their Hummers for
Priuses, or abstaining from joyrides on sunny Sunday afternoons, the wealthy can have those pleasures and pay others
to plant trees. Granted, if the wealthy are going to hang on to
their Hummers, buying carbon offsets is better than not buying
them. But this is wrong: what they ought to do is share the cost
that everyone else has to bear—namely, not having Hummers
at all, nor taking joyrides on sunny Sunday afternoons. Likewise, you should usually abstain from animal-friendly animal
products even if you can afford them.

Objections
Let’s consider a few objections. First, someone might point
out that not every non-wealthy person will have to give up
Sunday-afternoon joyrides. Someone might make sacrifices
elsewhere—perhaps taking public transportation the rest of
the time, or heating to a much lower temperature during the
winter, or whatever. Likewise, not every non-wealthy person
will have to eat mostly vegan. Some people will be willing to
adjust their lives in other ways to free up funds for meat. Still,
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most will make this sacrifice. Why should the decisions of the
majority determine the obligations of the wealthy?
What it’s reasonable to ask of others—and your standing in
a community—are inherently social phenomena. It’s unreasonable to ask of others what most people think it’s unreasonable
to ask of others; likewise, you have standing when the relevant
community grants it to you. And if most people think that it
would be unreasonable to expect people to forgo fruits and vegetables to afford animal products—or live in worse housing, or
to live without a car, or whatever—then it’s unreasonable to ask
as much, and you lack standing insofar as your view commits
you to that claim. Recall: one reason to limit your animal product consumption is to signal to others that it’s worth bearing the
cost that the Avoid-factory-farmed-products norm requires. By
not shouldering that burden, the wealthy signal the opposite,
which is that the good the norm would do isn’t worth the cost
it asks us to internalize. So either the epistemic and signaling
concerns aren’t that important, in which case my argument is
in trouble on independent grounds; or, they are important, and
the objection misfires for that reason.
Second, someone might argue that the non-wealthy needn’t
eat mostly vegan, since they could supplement their diets with
various non-objectionable sources of animal protein—e.g., insects, roadkill, food waste, etc.
There are two ways to take this objection. If the suggestion
is that the non-wealthy could supplement their diets in these
ways, then the reply is the same as the one I gave to the previous objection—namely, that if most people wouldn’t want to
supplement their diets in these ways, and would regard it as unreasonable to expect it of them, then it is, in fact, unreasonable
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to expect it of them. So, expecting such supplementation won’t
confirm that your expectations of others aren’t based on your
relatively privileged position, nor give you standing to take a
progressive moral position.
If, however, the suggestion is that the wealthy could supplement their diets with insects, roadkill, and their ilk, then the
point is a fair one, and the wealthy may indeed supplement
in these ways.8 Notice, though, that this just refines my main
claim—it doesn’t overturn it. Strictly speaking, my main claim
isn’t that the wealthy should eat mostly vegan, but that they
should drastically reduce their support even for animal-friendly animal products. However, since few people are going to
supplement their diets in these ways, I’ll continue to use the
phrase “eating mostly vegan,” since it best captures the practical upshot of my argument.
Third, someone might contend that if there really isn’t anything wrong with animal-friendly agriculture, then the wealthy
ought to support it, since that’s the only way to sustain a rival to
the industrial model. By buying animal-friendly products, the
wealthy preserve a marginal food system in hopes that it will
eventually become the dominant one.
Granted: if there is nothing wrong with animal-friendly agriculture, then it would be better if that model were to replace
the current industrial standard. However, we have no obligation to keep animal-friendly agriculture afloat, whereas we do
have an obligation not to support—and perhaps even to help
undermine—industrial animal agriculture. By reducing their
8 I’m assuming, of course, that none of them are objectionable, and I take
the assumption to be plausible. In defense of eating insects, see Fischer
(2016); in defense of eating roadkill, see Bruckner (2015).
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animal product consumption, the wealthy remove a significant
barrier to collective action: namely, having the non-wealthy
judge that the moral claims of the wealthy are unreasonable.
Again, in that way eating mostly vegan aids collective action,
providing a hard-to-fake signal that the wealthy will cooperate
with the non-wealthy to end a cruel institution.9 For that reason,
working against factory farms should take priority over aiding
animal-friendly operations.
Fourth, someone might object that my argument generalizes
in an odd way. If it works, then wealthy consumers shouldn’t
buy (say) electric cars over gas-powered ones, since others
can’t afford this more-moral option.
But this doesn’t follow at all. If we shouldn’t buy gas-powered cars, then my argument implies that the wealthy should
buy electric. This is because, by so doing, they thereby bear
the cost that the norm asks us to internalize (more expensive
vehicles with less pick up relative to their current, gas-powered
alternatives). And it’s an obligation that’s bolstered by the fact
that increased demand for electric cars will lower their cost,
making them available to average consumers. However, the
same isn’t true of animal products—or so I’ve argued.
Fifth, someone might insist that wealthier consumers don’t
harm average consumers, and so even if there is some unfairness here, it’s a minor matter.
There are two problems with this. On the one hand, you
might make the same point about people who drive Hummers. If this point doesn’t excuse them, it doesn’t excuse the
9 For more on the importance of hard-to-fake signals for collective action,
see Lawford-Smith (2015).
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relatively wealthy consumer. On the other, there’s a sense in
which supporting animal-friendly agriculture does harm average consumers. We’re supposing that average consumers are
mostly vegan de facto—they’d be happy to enjoy animal products if they could afford them, but often can’t. However, anyone
who buys animal-friendly products increases demand for them,
and insofar as supply is limited, drives up their price. So, by
supporting animal-friendly agriculture, relatively wealthy consumers make it harder for average consumers to get the products they’d like.
This might sound paradoxical, insofar as I’m arguing that
those with means should eat mostly vegan. Recall, however,
our assumption that there’s nothing wrong with that animalfriendly agriculture. The goal here isn’t to defend strict veganism; rather, it’s to argue that even those with means ought
to reduce their consumption of animal products significantly.
They can’t so easily buy themselves out of moral wrongdoing.
Finally, someone might contend that rather than eating
mostly vegan, the wealthy ought to subsidize the diets of the
non-wealthy, enabling them to eat more animal products.
This objection stands or falls on an empirical question. I’ve
argued that animal-friendly animal products aren’t scalable:
we can only produce so much, even if we switch entirely to
an animal-friendly model, and this because the ways of increasing productivity involve either welfare compromises or
unacceptable environmental costs. If that’s right, then an allanimal-friendly-agriculture world won’t be one in which there
are extra animal products to subsidize. Instead, everyone will
have to scale back dramatically. Of course, I might be wrong
about the empirical premise, in which case the objection is a
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good one. But if I’m wrong about the empirical premise, then
the objection also isn’t necessary, as my argument will have
failed at the first step.

Conclusion
Given the assumptions with which we began, it’s tempting
to think that there is nothing wrong with preserving your current level of animal product consumption: you just need to “eat
responsibly.” In so doing, however, you’re dodging the cost that
most people would have to bear were we to do away with factory farming—namely, eating mostly vegan. This is wrong.
So, even if there is nothing intrinsically wrong with supporting
animal-friendly agriculture, those with the means to support it
usually shouldn’t.
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